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PROMETHEUS RE-BOUND: How ADOPTION OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WOULD DEVASTATE THE
WESTERN U.S. COAL INDUSTRY
MICHAEL F. DUFFY*
As it approaches the 21s" century, the new millennium, and all that, the U.S.
coal industry does not lack for metaphorical models drawn from Greek mythol-
ogy. Confronted on all sides by acronymed ambuscaders-EPA, IRS, OSM,
BLM, MSHA and others-the coal industry might well identify with Hercules in
his battle with Hydra, the nine-headed monster capable of growing two new
heads for each one the Titan was able to lop off. Sisyphus and his uncooperative
boulder provide an apt analogy for the industry's frustration with trying to con-
vince the average American that energy doesn't originate in a wall outlet, that,
in fact, over 50% of this nation's electrical energy originates in a coal mine.'
In light of the current debate on global climate change and its implications
for the future of the coal industry, however, the myth of Prometheus provides a
most compelling metaphor. Prometheus, of course, was the Titan who stole fire
from heaven and brought it down to earth, much to the displeasure of Zeus. For
his audacity the Titan was exiled to Scythia where he was chained to an outcrop
on Mount Caucasus. Each day a vulture would feed on his liver; each night the
liver would rejuvenate itself.
There is more to the myth of Prometheus than this mere outline of the facts
conveys. For example, the name "Prometheus" means "foresight," a virtuous
trait that explains the Titan's motive in stealing fire from the gods in the first
place. Prometheus and his brother, Epimetheus, were given the task of creating
man and the animals:
Epimetheus accordingly proceeded to bestow upon the different ani-
mals the various gifts of courage, strength, swiftness, sagacity; wings to
one, claws to another, a shelly covering to a third, etc. But when man
came to be provided for, who was to be superior to all other animals,
Epimetheus had been so prodigal of his resources that he had nothing
left to bestow upon him. In his perplexity he resorted to his brother
Prometheus, who, with the aid of Minerva, went up to heaven, and
lighted his torch at the chariot of the sun, and brought fire down to
man. With this gift man was more than a match for all other animals
Prometheus' foresight lay in what he knew the gift of fire, i.e., energy,
would provide for mankind:
Deputy General Counsel, the National Mining Association.
1. Not long ago at a Washington, D.C. reception, an apparently well-educated gentleman was
heard to declare that coal was a primitive, outmoded and irrelevant source of energy. It was his
opinion that the U.S. ought to embark on a crash program to convert from coal to a cleaner fuel such
as "electricity."
2. THOMAS BULLFINCH, BULLFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 13 (1979).
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It enabled him to make ... tools with which to cultivate the earth; to
warm his dwelling, so as to be comparatively independent of climate;
and finally to introduce the arts and to coin money, the means of trade
and commerce.'
In Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, the Titan, himself, describes the impact of
his action on mankind:
[T]hey, before as babes,
By me were roused to reason, taught to think.
In one short word, then, learn the truth condensed,
All arts of mortals from Prometheus spring.'
If, as is chemically the case, coal is nothing more than stored solar energy,
i.e., the "fire" that Prometheus appropriated from the gods in order to make
civilization possible, the identification of the coal industry with the mythical
Titan is most appropriate. As the title of this Article suggests, however, the coal
industry may be facing the same fate as Prometheus.
In December of 1997, over 160 countries, including the United States, ne-
gotiated the Kyoto Protocol, a framework for establishing mandatory limits on
the emission of greenhouse gases by developed nations. By the terms of the
Protocol, some of those nations, designated Annex B countries,6 would be re-
quired to meet specified greenhouse gas emission levels relative to the levels
they emitted in 1990.! For example, the United States would be required to re-
duce its greenhouse gas emissions to a level 7% below 1990 levels.! Such re-
ductions would have to be achieved between the years 2008 and 2012 with ad-
ditional reductions thereafter subject to further negotiation.!
Because carbon emissions account for 83% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emis-
sions,' and since more than 98% of all U.S. carbon emissions can be traced to
3. Id.
4. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, in NINE GREEK DRAMAS 166, 182-84 (Charles W. Eliot
ed., 1937).
5. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Mar. 18, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf> [hereinafter Protocol].
6. Countries listed in Annex B include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States. United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (last modified Oct. 12, 1999)
<http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/index.html> (hereinafter Framework). Turkey and Belarus
declined to pledge reductions in their emissions pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol. OFFICE OF
INTEGRATED ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, IMPACTS OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL ON U.S. ENERGY MARKETS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY xi n.2 (1998) [hereinafter EIA
IMPACT STUDY].
7. See Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 3.
8. See Protocol, supra note 5, at Annex B.
9. See Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 3.
10. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xii.
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the burning of fossil fuels," the production of energy from coal will undoubtedly
be a principle focus of emissions reduction efforts should the United States seek
to implement the dictates of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, both governmental and
private organizations have attempted to estimate the economic impact of the
Kyoto Protocol on energy production and fuel selection over the next two dec-
ades with the coal industry a primary focus of these studies.
This article will focus on the projected impact of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S.
coal production in general and western U.S. coal production in particular as-
suming, of course, that the U.S. Senate elects to ratify the Protocol (to date, the
Clinton Administration did not submitted the Protocol for ratification, and, as
will be noted below, the Senate has expressed profound reservations with re-
spect to the Protocol in its current form). The discussion will begin with a brief
history of the western coal industry, followed by a summary of the evolution of
the global warming theory and its acceptance by the international political
community, as evidenced by the development of the Kyoto Protocol. That will
be followed by an overview of various economic predictions based on the as-
sumption of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The consequential impli-
cations for the future use of coal are then discussed. Lastly, the paper will at-
tempt to set forth the issues faced by American decision makers in weighing the
pros and cons of adopting the Kyoto Protocol or any other international attempt
to address the matter of global climate change.
I. THE RISE OF WESTERN COAL
The first historical record referring to coal in the New World is a map of
what is now northern Illinois charted in 1673-1674 by Louis Joliet and depicting
the presence of "charbon de terra."'2 Following the discovery of coal near Rich-
mond, Virginia in 1701, an 18"h century map of the upper Potomac River refers
to several "cole mines" along the current West Virginia-Maryland border." It is
well established, however, that Native Americans utilized coal for pottery firing
long before the settlers arrived."
The first recorded coal use west of the Mississippi was in 1804 when the
Lewis and Clark expedition stopped in present-day North Dakota to construct a
blacksmith's forge fueled by lignite.'" Contemporaneously, coal was used to heat
a Spanish fur trader's outpost in what is now Montana."' In 1854, the Territorial
Legislature of Utah offered a $1,000 reward to anyone who could discover a
coal supply within 40 miles of Salt Lake City," while by the early 1860's coal
mined near Denver was used to heat that city's homes and businesses." The true
11. See Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Emissions of
Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1997 15 (1998) [hereinafter EIA Emissions Report].
12. See Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Coal
Data: A Reference 1 (1995).
13. See id.
14. See Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Dept. of Energy, State Coal
Profiles I (1994) [hereinafter EIA State Coal Profiles].
15. See id. at 67.
16. See id. at 59.
17. Seeid. at91.
18. See id. at 23.
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spur to the development of the western U.S. coal industry, however, was the
establishment, expansion and maintenance of the transcontinental railway sys-
tem.
Beginning in 1835, Congress began granting rights of way to railroads
through public lands, a logical outgrowth of fights of way granted for canals in
the earlier years of the republic." In 1850, Stephen A. Douglas, of Lincoln-
Douglas debate fame, championed land grants beyond traditional rights of way
as an added incentive to the construction of railroads on public lands." Those
land grants provided readily available resources such as timber and stone for the
construction of the rail lines themselves.
The opening of the west as an adjunct to railway development, however,
came to full fruition with the passage of two Pacific Railroad Acts. The Act of
1862" incorporated the Union Pacific Railroad while the Act of 1864" estab-
lished the Northern Pacific Railroad. 3 In addition to providing 400 foot wide
fights of way to the railroads, the statutes also provided land grants of up to 20
sections of land" for every mile of railway constructed from Omaha to
Missouri."5 In addition, Congress withdrew up to 25 miles of land on either side
of the rights of way and prohibited entry for settlement or homesteading except
for those claims already established.6
In all, Congress granted nearly 94 million acres of public lands to the rail-
roads themselves and nearly an additional 224 million acres to states for devel-
opment of lands served by railroad expansion.2 Of the approximately 320 mil-
lion acres of total land grants, 30% or 97 million acres were located in those
western states now chiefly associated with coal mining: Arizona (18.3 million
acres); Colorado (8.2 million acres); Montana (20.7 million acres); New Mexico
(16.2 million acres); North Dakota (13.9 million acres); Utah (9.7 million acres);
and Wyoming (10.1 million acres)."
A condition was placed upon the railroad land grants in the initial 1862 Act,
i.e., that "all mineral lands shall be excepted from the operation of this act."'
That exception was modified in the 1864 Act, however, when Congress pro-
vided that the term "mineral lands" was not intended to include coal and iron
lands.' Thus, Congress expressed its intent that coal and iron, like stone and
19. See PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 357 (1968).
20. See id.
21. Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
22. Pacific Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365 (1864).
23. Subsequent legislation established the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad (Act of July 27, 1866,
ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292 (1866)), and the Texas Pacific Railroad (Act of March 8, 1871, ch. 122, 16 Stat.
573 (1871)).
24. A section measures 640 acres.
25. See GATES, supra note 19, at 364.
26. See GATES, supra note 19, at 364.
27. See GATES, supra note 19, at 385.
28. See GATES, supra note 19, at 385. For purposes of this Article, discussion of "western
coal" will be confined to these seven states.
29. Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492 (1862).
30. See Pacific Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 217, § 3, 13 Stat. 365, 367-68 (1864).
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timber in the earlier enactments, were meant to be utilized in the construction,
expansion, and maintenance of the railway system. That intent was ratified in
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Soderberg,3' when the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that both coal and iron were necessary materials to the construction and
operation of the railroads?2
Contemporaneous to the passage of the initial railroad acts, Congress began
addressing the sale of federal coal lands in 1864. As part of the Townsite Act of
1864, Congress provided for the public sale of coal lands pursuant to Presiden-
tial order." Such lands were to be sold in tracts of "suitable legal subdivisions"
for a minimum of $20 per acre.' Thereafter, Congress amended the 1864 Act by
allowing entry onto federal lands by those persons "in the business of bona fide
actual coal-mining" for purposes of purchasing tracts of up to 160 acres."
The size of acquirable tracts was increased in 1873 with the passage of the
Coal Lands Act, which provided that associations of four or more persons could
qualify to purchase up to 640 acres of federal coal land if they could show that
they had expended at least $5,000 in the development and improvement of the
coal mine or mines situated on the land." The 1873 Act further provided that
each person or association was entitled to acquire only one tract, and that a
minimum price of $20 per acre be set for lands within 15 miles of an existing
railroad and $10 per acre for lands beyond the 15 mile swath."
Other than the Act for the Protection of the Lives of Miners in the Territo-
ries,' which set rudimentary mine safety standards and provided for a coal mine
inspector in each Territory, no further significant legislation affecting coal mines
was passed until the first decade of this century when Congress adopted the Coal
Land Acts of 1909" and 1910.' Those Acts were passed as a result of President
Roosevelt's decision to withdraw federal lands that, in the judgment of the Di-
rector of the Geological Survey, contained exploitable coal deposits." From mid
to late 1906, the Acting Secretary of the Interior carried out Roosevelt's policy
31. 188 U.S. 526 (1903).
32. Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 529-30. Coal, of course, was necessary to the forging of steel to
produce rails as well as a fuel for steam-powered locomotives. Thus, for example, the Union Pacific
Railroad developed eight mines in Wyoming from 1869 to 1888, and by 1885 that railroad company
owned or controlled most of the coal production in Colorado. Thomas E. Root, Railroad Land
Grants from Canals to Transcontinentals 1987 A.B.A. NATL. RESOURCES SEC., MONOGRAPH
SERIES No.4 70-71.
33. See Pacific Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 205, 13 Stat. 343 (1864).
34. Id.
35. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 107, 13 Stat. 529 (1865).
36. See Act to Provide for the Sale of the Lands of the United States Containing Coal, ch. 279,
17 Stat. 607 (1873), superseded by Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920).
37. See id.
38. Seech. 564,26 Stat. 1104(1891).
39. See 30 U.S.C. § 81(1994).
40. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (1994).
41. See GATES, supra note 19, at 726. Roosevelt's motivation for the withdrawals is believed
to have been a growing concern that the provisions of the earlier Coal Lands Acts limiting entries
upon coal lands to one per person or one per association were being circumvented through the use of
dummy entries, strawmen, or by the acquisition of coal lands under the pretense of acquiring them
pursuant to other federal land grant programs such as the various agricultural and homesteading acts.
GATES, supra note 19, at 726.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
by issuing orders withdrawing approximately 66 million acres from coal devel-
opment.'2
Congress countered the withdrawals by allowing for entry upon coal lands
for agricultural and homesteading purposes, but reserved to the U.S. government
the fight to prospect, mine, and remove the coal." Finally, in 1920 Congress
adopted a comprehensive approach to the development of coal and other re-
sources such as oil, gas, and several nonmetallic minerals, when it passed the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920." That Act provided that coal fights on federal
lands would be obtainable only through a leasing system." If exploitable coal
reserves were known to exist on a federal parcel, fights to mine the coal would
be made subject to competitive bids." If, on the basis of prospecting activity on a
federal parcel, a lease applicant was able to demonstrate the presence of previ-
ously undiscovered coal reserves in commercial quantities, that lease applicant
would be given a preferential right to the coal."
Once the railroads provided a reliable market for readily accessible coal, and
federal acquisition procedures were implemented, coal production in the western
states grew rapidly from the late 1800's into the early decades of this century."
The energy needs of the country during World War I provided an additional spur
to production."
A combination of factors, including oil and gas development in the South-
west and Wyoming, the rise of hydroelectric power in the Northwest, and, of
course, the devastating effects of the Great Depression resulted in a sharp de-
cline in coal production in the 1920's and 1930's.' The demands of World War II
sparked a slight resurgence in western production in the first half of the 1940's,
but only Utah, at about 7 million short tons produced annually during the
1940's, appreciably exceeded the levels it had reached in the 1920's." In the
aggregate, the production for the seven states addressed here totaled only about
42. GATES, supra note 19, at 726.
43. See 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1994).
44. See ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1994)).
45. See id. at § 2, 41 Stat. at 438-39; 30 U.S.C. §184(a).
46. See id. at § 2; 41 Stat. at 438; 30 U.S.C.§ 201(a), repealed by scattered sections of 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-352 (1994), subject to valid existing rights.
47. Id.
48. See DEPT. OF ENERGY, State Coal Profiles (visited Oct. 15, 1999)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coallstatepro/imagemap/usaimagemap.htm> [hereinafter EIA State
Coal Profiles Website].
49. During that period Colorado led coal production in the western states producing 12 million
short tons by 1920. Wyoming was a close second producing more than 9 million short tons during
World War I. Utah, Montana, and New Mexico, respectively, reached 6 million, 5 million, and 4
million short tons, by 1920, while North Dakota reached production levels of I million short tons of
lignite during the same period. While Arizona coal utilization dates back to pre-Columbian times, its
production levels until the 1970's are negligible in comparison with its fellow western states. EIA
STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 11, 23, 59, 63, 67, 87, 91, 107. See also EIA State Coal
Profiles Website, supra note 48 (illustrating through state-by-state graphs the fluctuations in
production).
50. See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 23, 59, 67, 91.
5I. See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 91.
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28 million short tons in 1947.2 Thereafter, the western coal industry experienced
a further precipitous decline in production during the 1950's and early 1960's
owing to the railroads' replacement of coal-fired steam locomotives with diesel-
powered engines."
Two momentous events in the early 1970's fostered the boom in western
coal production that continues to this day: the passage of the Clean Air Act" in
1970 and the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974. The Clean Air Act mandated that
stationary sources, such as electricity generating power plants, reduce their
emissions of identified pollutants including sulfur oxides." Given the choice
between installing scrubbers and shifting to lower sulfur fuel, electric utilities
actively sought new fuel sources in the West where the sulfur content of the
coal, on the whole, was markedly lower than the sulfur content found in the
traditional coal fields of the Midwest and Appalachia.'
The Arab oil embargo spurred Congress to enact legislation aimed at reduc-
ing America's reliance on foreign and, in many cases, unpredictable supply lines
for its ever-expanding energy needs. Through passage of the Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act of 1974," and the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978," Congress went on record as supporting a switch from oil
and natural gas to coal as the preferred fuel for electricity generation. Given the
circumstances of international turmoil and domestic agitation for stricter envi-
ronmental controls, the slumping fortunes of western coal were ripe for rejuve-
nation."
By the mid-1990's the sleeping giant had indeed awakened. In 1997, the
combined tonnages of bituminous, subbituminous, and lignite coal in the states
of Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota. Utah, and Wyo-
ming equaled 446 million short tons or about half of all U.S. production.' Wyo-
ming alone accounted for more than a quarter of U.S. production, at 282 million
tons." Thus, in a little more than a century the western coal industry increased its
52. See EIA State Coal Profiles Website, supra note 48.
53. See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 59, 91.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
55. See id. § 7403(g)(1).
56. See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 23, 27, 31, 59.
57. See Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 2, 88 Stat. 246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-98 (1994)).
58. Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289, repealed in part by Act of May 21, 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-42, 101 Stat. 310 (1987).
59. One commentator noted the following:
For more than a century, western coal was the prisoner of geography. It was
present in enormous abundance, but lay too far from major markets. Railroads
mined a moderate amount for their own use, but that market died with the steam
locomotive. Relatively small amounts were produced for western steel mills and
other industrial use.
Finally the sleeping giant of western coal is beginning to awaken. Western coal is
low in sulfur content, and that automatically gives it new value in the eyes of
midwestern utilities.
E.B. Leisenring, Jr., Western Coal-The Sleeping Giant, in Nineteenth Annual Proceedings of the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 1, 6-7 (1974).
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yearly output by 430 million tons. " Even more astounding, the recoverable re-
serves at currently producing mines in those states (excluding Arizona) now
stand at more than 11 billion short tons.63
II. "GLOBAL WARMING" AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The Swedish Nobelist Svante August Arrhenius (1859-1927) is credited
with the first articulation of the global warming theory in an Article entitled On
the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air Upon the Temperature of the Ground,
in which he argued that variations in the earth's temperature were owing to in-
creases or decreases in the quantity of carbon dioxide (then, "carbonic acid") in
the atmosphere.' Arrhenius' speculations on the absorptive qualities of atmos-
pheric gases led to the conclusion by others that the earth is not warmed solely
by the radiant energy of the sun; rather, the radiant energy reflected back by the
earth's surface is absorbed by atmospheric gases which trap heat in the lower
atmosphere to create the so-called greenhouse effect.6
Were it not for the naturally occurring greenhouse effect, scientists speculate
that the average temperature of the Earth's surface would be minus 19 degrees
Celsius as opposed to actual average temperature of plus 15 degrees Celsius.'
The gases most responsible for capturing heat to create the greenhouse effect
are: water vapor (H20), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(NO), and a number of man-made chemicals called halocarbons, which include
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) and hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFC's).'7
62. See EIA State Coal Profiles Website, supra note 48.
63. See Energy Info. Admin., Dept. of Energy, Recoverable Coal Reserves at Producing
Mines by State (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/cla/html/
t25pOpl.html>.
64. Svante August Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the
Temperature of the Ground, PHILOSOPHICAL MAG. 237 (1896), reprinted at the Nobel Prize Internet
Archive (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <www.almaz.com/nobel/chemistry/1903a.html> with link to
excerpted text located at <http://maple.lemoyne.edu/-guinta/Arrhenius.html>. The original article
was an extract from a paper presented by Arrhenius to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences on
Dec. 11, 1895.
65. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. The greenhouse effect has been
explained as follows:
[Greenhouse gases] are relatively transparent to incoming shortwave radiation,
but are relatively opaque to outgoing longwave radiation. The latter radiation,
which would otherwise escape to space, is trapped . . . within the lower levels of
the atmosphere. The subsequent re-radiation of some of the energy back to the
Earth maintains higher surface temperatures than would occur if the gases were
absent.
EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 150.
66. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-2.
67. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-5. Water vapor's prevalence in the
atmosphere (owing to the continuous process of evaporation condensation and precipitation) dwarfs
that of the other greenhouse gases; it accounts for 1% of the atmosphere while carbon dioxide
constitutes less than 0.04 percent. Id. at 2. Methane, in turn, accounts for 0.005 percent of the
atmosphere, while nitrous oxide comprises 0.0009 percent. Id. at 1 tbl. 1. The halocarbons, measured
in parts per trillion versus parts per million for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, have
been addressed elsewhere by the international community because of their potentially adverse effect
[Vol. 77:2
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It is important to keep in mind that the vast percentage of so-called green-
house gases occurs naturally. For example, of the 157.5 billion metric tons' of
carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere in 1992, 150 billion metric tons
were naturally produced by releases from the oceans (90 billion metric tons),
aerobic decay of vegetation (30 billion metric tons), and plant and animal respi-
ration (30 billion metric tons)." Accordingly, carbon dioxide attributed to human
activity, or anthropogenic carbon dioxide, now amounts to about 4.5% of the
total carbon dioxide released on an annual basis."
The theory of global warming postulates that naturally occurring greenhouse
gases are maintained in a state of equilibrium by their being absorbed and re-
moved from the atmosphere." For instance, in the carbon-cycle, carbon dioxide
is absorbed by plants and through the process of photosynthesis is converted into
oxygen, which is released into the atmosphere, and carbon, which becomes part
of the plants' biomass." According to one group of experts, the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)," the increased production of anthro-
pogenic carbon dioxide since the dawn of the industrial age has upset the natural
equilibrium of the carbon cycle."
The IPCC was established in 1988 by the WMO and UNEP to assess the
scientific, technical, and socio-economic issues associated with climate change."
Thereafter, in 1990, the United Nations formed the Intergovernmental Negoti-
ating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, the work of
which culminated in the issuance of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC) adopted in May of 1992 and presented for signature in Rio de
Janeiro in June of that year." The United States was among the 160 nations to
sign the agreement referred to as the Rio Treaty, which called for voluntary
efforts to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide to 1990 levels by the year 2000."
on the ozone layer. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541, 1551.
68. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to tons are to metric tons. One metric ton is
equal to 1.102 short tons. EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 4 n.5.
69. See id. at 2 tbl. 2, 4.
70. The anthropogenic shares of methane and nitrous oxide are more difficult to determine. In
a document released in 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an
international body commissioned by the United Nations, estimated that total methane naturally
emitted between 1980 and 1990 was within a range of 110-210 million metric tons, while 300-450
million tons could be attributed to human activity. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 92-93 (1996) [hereinafter
IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 19951.
71. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-2.
72. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 4.
73. See text accompanying footnote 75.
74. IPPC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 70, at 59-60. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have increased
25% since the dawn of the industrial age owning to anthropogenic activities such as the use of fossil
fuels for transportation, electricity generation, and heating, as well as to the removal of carbon
dioxide absorbing plants through deforestation. IPPC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 70, at 59.
See also infra note 80 and accompanying text.
75. See EJA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
76. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
77. See EIA IMPACT STUDY. supra note 6, at xi.
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Thereafter, the FCCC Committee established a Conference of the Parties
(COP) to begin implementing the Rio Treaty.9 In 1995, the COP issued what is
referred to as the Berlin Mandate, directing Annex B countries to take "appro-
priate action" to set overall limitation and reduction targets for greenhouse gases
to be implemented in the year 2000 and beyond.79 Meanwhile, the IPCC, in
1995, issued an Assessment Report, which despite its recognition of significant
scientific uncertainties, declared that the "balance of evidence suggests . . . a
discernable human influence on global climate."'" These various activities cul-
minated in the Kyoto Protocol, which established binding emissions targets for
the Annex B countries relative to their 1990 emissions levels." Under the Proto-
col, the established emissions targets must be reached between 2008 and 2012,
but demonstrable results must be shown by 2005." The target levels are to be
maintained through 2012 and further reductions may be instituted by the COP."
The Protocol does not dictate any particular means of reducing emissions but
does offer options such as the enhancement of carbon sinks" through reforesta-
tion and other land use changes, and the encouragement of energy efficiency."5
The Protocol also provides for emissions trading among Annex B countries, and
credits for developed nations that sponsor projects for reducing emissions in
developing nations."
Developed countries are allowed to bank Clean Development Mechanisms
(CDM) credits achieved prior to 2008 for future use, but they cannot borrow
against anticipated allowances." Annex B countries may also join together to
create an umbrella or bubble arrangement whereby they can collectively reach
their aggregate target through trade-offs among themselves."
Despite the range of options, however, there are innumerable uncertainties
as to how the Protocol will actually work. The parties have not yet determined
whether and how to account for emissions credits owing to the enhancement of
carbon sequestration through carbon sinks and other land use initiatives.9 Like-
wise, no system exists for establishing emissions credits and overseeing their
78. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
79. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
80. IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 70, at 5.
81. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 3.
82. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 3.
83. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xiii.
84. See Framework, supra note 6, at art. 1. "Carbon sinks" refers to vegetation, such as forests
or soil reservoirs that absorb or take up released carbon from another part of the carbon cycle.
85. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 3-4. With respect to the last option, the Protocol
establishes a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) whereby Annex B countries can collect
emissions credits for technology transfers to non-Annex B countries that provide demonstrable and
long-term reductions in emissions. Such activities are to be evaluated and certified through a
mechanism to be developed under the Protocol. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
86. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
87. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
88. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4. For example, the emissions target for the
European Community is 8% below its aggregate 1990 levels, as is the target for each of its members.
Id. By mutual agreement, however, the members could reallocate their respective responsibilities to
meet the umbrella target. Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 4.
89. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
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trading among developed nations. ' Further, no system of sanctions for outright
nonattainment of targets or misrepresenting efforts to achieve attainment has
been developed."
In its current manifestation, the Protocol exempts developing nations from
any legal obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions although they may
"volunteer" to enter the ranks of Annex B countries through amendment of the
Protocol."2 That exemption was crucial to the acceptance of the Protocol by de-
veloping nations that argued that the imposition of emissions targets upon them
would stymie their efforts to establish and expand their economies.'3 It should be
noted, however, that among the exempted nations are some of America's formi-
dable or potentially formidable trade competitors, e.g., China, India, Mexico,
and Brazil." Moreover, unrestrained by the dictates of the Protocol, the devel-
oping nations will account for an ever-increasing share of global greenhouse gas
emissions." For example, in 1990 the developing nations emitted 25% of global
carbon emissions.' By 2015, that percentage will rise to more than 50% of the
global target anticipated by the Protocol.'7
III. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
There is no want of opinion on the impacts of America's implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol. The Clinton Administration released three prominent and
significantly conflicting scenarios: one by the President's Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA);" one by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) within
the Department of Energy;" and a third, also emanating from the Department of
Energy, known as the Five Lab Study." Several private sector studies have also
been issued, five of which have been selected by the EIA in its own study for
purposes of comparison with its projections on economic impact: the WEFA
Study,"' the CRA Study," the MIT Study, 3 the EPRI Study,"' and the DRI
Study.'
90. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xi.
91. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
92. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
93. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
94. See Global Warming: The High Cost of the Kyoto Protocol, National and State Impacts,
WHARTON ECONOMETRICS FORECASTING ASSOCIATES 10 (hereinafter WEFA).
95. See id. at 14.
96. See id. This percentage is a close approximation.
97. See id.
98. Administration Economic Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of Climate Change at a
Reasonable Cost, 148 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) T-1 (July 31, 1998). The CEA scenario
is also summarized in testimony presented by Dr. Janet Yellen, CEA Chairman, given before the
House Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Energy and Power on March 4, 1998.
99. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6.
100. Dept. of Energy, Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and Low-Carbon
Technologies, Scenarios of U.S. Carbon Reductions: Potential Impacts of Energy Technologies by
2010 and Beyond 1.1 (1997).
101. WEFA, supra note 94.
102. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 137. Paul M. Bernstein and W. David Montgomery
of Charles River Associates are acknowledged as contributors to the comparison study. No formal
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The EIA study is, by far, the most comprehensive analysis of the effects of
the Kyoto Protocol and will, therefore, serve as the principle analytical source
for this discussion." The merits and demerits of the global warming theory are
beyond the scope of this Article. So are also the persuasiveness or lack thereof
exhibited by the various economic studies that have been produced in the wake
of the Kyoto Protocol. The purpose of this Article is to lay before the reader the
range of potential impacts thus far identified by the EIA with respect to the use
of coal, including western coal, if this country adopts the Kyoto Protocol as
currently structured. That said, reference to other studies will be made as appro-
priate.
IV. THE EIA STUDY
At the behest of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science,
the EIA, in October of 1998, issued its study entitled Impacts of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity.' ' The Committee re-
quested that the EIA consider several possible scenarios involving various po-
tential levels of carbon reduction by the United States in response to the Kyoto
Protocol focusing on "U.S. energy use and prices and the economy in the 2008-
2012 time frame," i.e., the time frame within which the Protocol directs the de-
veloped nations to reach their initial emissions targets.' '
In preparing its analysis, EIA utilized its National Energy Modeling System
(NEMS), a comprehensive integrated computer model capable of simulating all
elements of energy supply and demand within the context of the nation's macro-
economy.'" The NEMS is used to produce EIA's annual American Energy Out-
looks that set forth year-by-year projections for U.S. energy production and
consumption through the year 2020. "' The report includes a projection, called
the "reference case," which plots the energy-use horizon on the assumption that
all existing laws and regulations will be fully implemented, and that no new
relevant laws or regulations will be passed during the period under review."' The
reference case can then serve as a baseline for comparing scenarios that incorpo-
rate significant regulatory or policy changes."2
title is given to the CRA Study beyond that acknowledgment. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at
137 & n.91.
103. Henry D. Jacoby et al., CO2 Emissions Limits: Economic Adjustments and the Distribution
of Burdens, 1997 ENERGY J. 31.
104. Alan Manne & Richard Richels, On Stabilizing CO, Concentrations-Cost-Effective
Emission Reduction Strategies, 2 ENVTL. MODELING & ASSESSMENT 251-65 (1997).
105. Standard and Poor's DRI, The Impact of Meeting the Kyoto Protocol on Energy Markets
and the Economy (1998).
106. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6.
107. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6.
108. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at iii.
109. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 6.
110. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 6.
11I. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 8.
112. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 6.
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Against the reference case, EIA posits six scenarios involving different re-
duction targets for carbon emissions."' The six cases, in reverse order of strin-
gency, are: 1990 + 24% carbon emissions; 1990 + 14% carbon emissions; 1990
+ 9% carbon emissions; 1990 carbon emissions; 1990 - 3% carbon emissions;
and 1990- 7% carbon emissions."'
The EIA study then determines the costs of achieving each target level. This
determination is made by first establishing a "carbon price" and then applying it
to the cost of energy."' EIA defines a "carbon price" as "the marginal cost of
reducing carbon emissions to the specified level or, conversely, the value of
consuming the last metric ton of carbon," and likens it to the price that could be
established through a carbon emissions permit system."' The carbon price in this
case, i.e., the price per ton of carbon emissions, is then applied to each of the
energy fuels at its point of consumption relative to its carbon content."'
In order to arrive at the carbon price for each case, EIA makes certain as-
sumptions, which, while not shared by other analysts, are at least consistent
throughout the various scenarios. For example, EIA assumes that carbon sinks
and other carbon sequestration activities by the U.S. would result in the absorp-
tion of 3% of America's carbon emissions."' Second, because the final contours
of an international system for trading carbon emissions permits are too uncer-
tain, EIA assumes the creation of an intra-U.S. trading system for auctioning of
carbon emissions permits, and assumes that the price achieved through that sys-
tem would be the same as that achieved through an international system."9 Third,
EIA does not assume that the United States would receive credits for technology
transfer programs entered into with developing nations under the CDM provi-
sions of the Protocol."' Lastly, EIA does not assume that new nuclear plants
would come on line but it does assume that all currently operating units would
continue to operate through 2020.'
As for the time frames for achieving the emissions targets, EIA's analysis
conforms to the expectations of the Protocol: demonstrable steps toward compli-
ance by 2005; attainment of the reduction targets between 2008 and 2012; and,
maintenance of the target levels until 2020 or until further reductions are negoti-
ated pursuant to international agreements.' Given those assumptions, the EIA
113. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10.
114. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10-11. The study concentrates on three of the six
scenarios, the 1990 + 24% case, the 1990 + 9% case, and the 1990 - 3% case. EIA IMPACT STUDY,
supra note 6, at 11. For comparison purposes, the reference case, i.e.. business as usual with no
mandated reductions, would amount to 1990 + 33% carbon emissions, or 1791 million tons. EIA
IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10.
115. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 11.
116. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 12.
117. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 11. The higher the carbon content of a given fuel, the
higher the carbon emissions and, in turn, the carbon price. Among its fossil competitors, coal
produces the highest carbon emissions, natural gas the lowest, and oil somewhere in between.
Nuclear power, hydropower, and other renewables produce no carbon emissions and carry no carbon
prices. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 11.
118. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
119. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 13.
120. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 5.
121. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 25.
122. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xiii.
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study estimates the carbon price for each case (expressed in 1996 dollars per ton








With these carbon prices established, EIA proceeds to analyze their effect on
the marketability of each energy fuel under each scenario.'2 First, the market-
ability of coal is severely if not fatally eroded because coal combustion produces
more carbon emissions than any of its competitors."' No matter how efficient the
industry becomes in producing, transporting, and utilizing its product, absent a
method for recovering carbon emissions, coal will be saddled with a "carbon
tax" that would overwhelm whatever productivity gains it might achieve over
the next two decades.'
The average delivered price per ton of coal, reflecting the costs of produc-
tion, transportation, and its "carbon price" for each scenario is shown in the
following chart:
123. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xv-xvi tbl. ES1 & tbl. ES2.
124. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 12.
125. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xvi & xix fig. ES9.
126. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xv-xvi.
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Coal Prices to Electricity Generators (1996 Dollars/Short-ton)'"
2005 2010 2020
Reference Case 23.37 22.20 19.56
1990+24% 25.96 57.03 71.95
1990+ 14% 49.51 90.53 85.72
1990+9% 64.24 109.56 95.33
1990 69.51 162.69 129.43
1990-3% 74.07 185.47 156.60
1990 -7% 79.18 214.75 197.61
While the relative prices of other fossil fuels also increase in relation to the
reference case because they, too, must absorb a carbon price add-on, they do not
increase as dramatically as the price of coal owing to their relatively lower car-
bon content." For example, in the 1990 + 9% case, the average price for deliv-
ered coal (base price plus carbon price premium) to electricity generating plants
increases 346 to 368 percent over the reference case in the 2008-2012 period,
while the price of natural gas increases only 64 to 74 percent, and the price of oil
increases only 25 to 29 percent."
Beyond the competitive disadvantage coal would experience vis-a-vis other
fossil fuels, it would suffer in comparison with nuclear power and renewable
fuels as they would not be subject to any carbon price premium. Consequently,
under the 1990 + 9% case, coal's market share in the electricity generating sec-
tor falls from nearly 20 quadrillion BTUs to about 5 quadrillion BTUs between
2005 and 2020." Conversely, the 15 quadrillion BTU gap is filled by (in de-
127. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 202-203 tbl. B 16. The delivered price per short
ton in 1996 is set at $26.45.
128. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 22.
129. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 22.
130. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 29 fig. 22.
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scending order of market share) natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectric power,
renewables, and oil."'
As coal's competitiveness declines, its annual production also declines, as
shown in this chart:
U.S. Coal Production (in Millions of Tons)...
2005 2010 2020
Reference Case 1,242 1,287 1,376
1990+24% 1,182 1,032 805
1990+14% 1,090 785 538
1990+9% 989 624 405
1990 946 418 207
1990-3% 924 369 172
1990-7% 867 313 144
A consequence of the decline in production will be a steady and substantial
decline in coal mine employment as shown in this chart:
13 1. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 29 fig. 22.




Reference Case 75,000 68,519 60,000
1990+24% 75,000 58,223 40,000
1990+14% 75,000 50,224 37,500
1990+9% 75,000 42,531 25,000
1990 75,000 32,053 15,000
1990-3% 75,000 29,187 12,500
1990-7% 75,000 25,486 11,000
The EIA analysis treats coal as a heterogeneous commodity and distin-
guishes among ranks, e.g., bituminous, subbituminous and lignite, by BTU out-
put, or by sulfur dioxide and ash content.'" This treatment makes it somewhat
difficult to extrapolate specific consequences for western coal across the various
scenarios. EIA does, however, speculate that because, for the most part, western
coal must be transported significantly greater distances than its eastern counter-
part, it will suffer the disadvantage of having to absorb both its own carbon price
as well as that associated with transportation, i.e., the carbon price of fuel for
diesel locomotives, barges, and trucks."'
Moreover, given the precipitous downturn in demand for coal, EIA antici-
pates that investment in coal, if there is any, will be in rejuvenating existing
older mines rather than in initiating new ones.' 6 Because most new mining has
133. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23, fig. 109. Coal mine employment as
of 1996 is set at 83,462. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23, fig. 109. The figures in
column "2005" and "2020" are close approximations.
134. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 110.
135. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 110-12.
136. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, 22-23.
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been originating in the West, EIA believes that the West will suffer
accordingly."
On the basis of these opinions EIA projects selective consequences specific
to western coal in terms of percentage share of U.S. production and coal mine
employment, as shown in the following two charts:
Western Coal's Percentage Share of U.S. Production"
1996 2010 2020
Reference Case 47% 57% 62%
1990+24% 47% 54% 45%
1990+9% 47% 39% 32%
190-3% 47% 28% 19%
137. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xviii.




Western Coal Mining Jobs In 2010"'
Reference 1990+ 24% 1990 + 9% 1990 - 3% 1990 - 7%
Case
Powder 5,013 3,827 1,829 844 673
River
Basin
Other 5,693 4,785 2,254 941 895
West
Total 10,706 8,612 4,083 1,785 1,568
V. COAL'S DIFFICULTIES BEYOND THE EIA PROJECTIONS
The dire predictions in the EIA study, substantially supported by other
analyses undertaken by the private sector, ought to be sufficient cause for the
coal industry to dread the imposition of the Kyoto Protocol. Unfortunately, the
situation may actually be worse.
First, the emissions target specified for the United States in the Protocol, 7%
below the 1990 emissions level, " is increasingly irrelevant. U.S. carbon emis-
sions from the combustion of energy fuels reached 1,463 million metric tons in
1996, or 8.7% higher than the 1,346 million tons emitted in 1990.' The actual
percentage reduction needed to reach the Protocol target is therefore increasing
as the United States approaches 2008 to 2012, the period during which we are
ostensibly expected to meet the 1990 - 7% target.'2 Thus, in 1996, the percent-
age reduction needed to meet the Protocol target rose to 15.7 % (7% + 8.7%)
and that number continues to climb in a growing economy."' For example, EIA's
139. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23. "Powder River Basin" includes
Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, while "Other West" includes Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New
Mexico, Alaska and Washington (Alaska's and Washington's shares are negligible). See EIA
IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23.
140. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
141. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xii & 208 tbl. B19.
142. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xiii.
143. This phenomenon is noted by the EIA:
AE095 [the EIA's American Energy Outlook issued in 1995] projected that
energy-related carbon emissions would reach 1,471 million metric tons in 2000, a
level nearly reached in 1996 when emissions were 1,436 million metric tons. Each
subsequent AEO has raised the estimate of carbon emissions, primarily because of
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American Energy Outlook in 2000, AEO 2000, states that carbon emissions in
the year 2000 are expected to reach 1,552 million metric tons, or 15% above the
1990 level, thereby raising the target to 22% (7% + 15%).'"
Second, in response to the establishment of the FCCC, the Clinton admini-
stration launched the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP).'' The CCAP offered
several dozen proposals for the reduction of greenhouse gases including volun-
tary programs, economic incentives, research and development, energy effi-
ciency initiatives, and land use programs." The plan purported to reduce total
net emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.' 7 The
CCAP fell short of the mark. For example, instead of achieving a reduction of
95 million tons of emissions through CCAP initiatives by 2000, as the plan pro-
jected, EIA estimates that the initiatives might only achieve a reduction of 36
million tons of emissions, and then, not until the year 2010."'
Likewise, the EIA discounts other claims of the CCAP on the evidence that
certain voluntary programs have proven less successful than anticipated, funding
for certain CCAP program has been less than requested, and U.S. economic
growth (and therefore, energy demand) has been higher than that expected by
the plan's sponsors."' The net results of the CCAP show that the Clinton Ad-
ministration's assumptions regarding the success of domestic actions to reduce
carbon emissions were overly optimistic. Indeed, assuming U.S. acceptance of
the Protocol, the shortcomings of the CCAP presage an increase in the strin-
gency of measures necessary to reach emissions targets as the implementation
period draws near."
Third, fundamental uncertainties regarding the likelihood and efficacy of an
international emissions trading system seriously undermine the more optimistic
predictions relating to meeting the Protocol targets, and doing so in a relatively
painless way. The Protocol itself declares that emissions trading arrangements
must be subsidiary to concrete programs for reducing carbon emissions."'
Moreover, those Annex B countries that may potentially have emissions alloca-
tions to trade, principally the former Soviet bloc countries, may choose, instead,
to bank their credits against future emissions on the belief that their economies
lower price projections that encourage energy use and reduce the penetration of
renewable sources of energy.
EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
144. See Energy Info. Admin., Dept. of Energy, Annual Energy Outlook 2000 With Projections
to 2010 (visited Oct. 25, 2000) <http://www.eai.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/issues.html>.
145. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
146. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
147. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2..
148. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
149. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
150. The Administration's contention that carbon sequestration through sinks and modified
land use practices is a case in point. Although the EIA refers several times to U.S. State Department
and Council of Economic Advisors' claims that agriculture and land use programs and credits for
greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide may offset carbon dioxide emissions up to 4%, the EIA
appears to be somewhat skeptical. "[T]he rules to account for agriculture and forestry emissions and
sinks have yet to be developed and are subject to considerable uncertainty." EIA IMPACT STUDY,
supra note 6, at 9.
151. See Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 6.
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will rebound over the next several decades. 2 More fundamentally, without the
experience of an international trading system as a guide, it is impossible to pre-
dict how such a system will operate as a practical matter or how it might be
compromised by other geopolitical conflicts and tensions.
Similarly, the jury is definitely out as to whether and to what extent signifi-
cant carbon "credits" might be obtained through technology transfers between
Annex B countries and developing countries under the so-called CDM provision
in the treaty. 3 Given the American public's inherent skepticism regarding the
need for and utility of foreign aid expenditures, it is difficult to comprehend that
taxpayers would support additional transfers of money overseas, particularly if
that money is being used to finance job growth in new technologies even while
U.S. jobs in fundamental industry sectors are being eliminated by cutbacks in
domestic energy demand. Conversely, if CDM initiatives are undertaken by the
United States in lieu of traditional foreign aid expenditures, developing nations
may resent having their discretion to redistribute American largesse circum-
scribed.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there is a certain irrationality in a
system that purports to reduce "global" carbon emissions but exempts the vast
majority of countries from having to participate in the enterprise. The equity
argument, that the developed nations (most prominently, the United States) emit
more greenhouse gases, and therefore, should be exclusively responsible for
reducing them, is initially seductive but eventually falls under clear-eyed scru-
tiny: 1) over the life of the Protocol the emissions that developed nations elimi-
nate will simply be replaced by those of the developing nations as their econo-
mies expand such that the campaign against global warming becomes a zero-
sum game; moreover, 2) the levels of emissions produced by the developed
nations merely reflect the levels of goods and services produced by those na-
tions. In any event, the inconsistent applicability of the Protocol'.s mandate may
serve to undermine public support in the developed countries for unilateral ef-
forts to reduce emissions.
These four issues call into serious question whether a smooth glide path can
be taken to reduce U.S. emissions to meet the Protocol's target as certain sectors
in the Clinton Administration had suggested. If the options touted for achieving
emissions targets do not materialize or prove to be less successful than adver-
tised, the carbon price discussed above will increase and coal-fired energy pro-
duction will become even less competitive than the EIA analyses predict.
VI. RE-BOUND OR ON THE REBOUND?
Fortunately for the coal industry, the same uncertainties that threaten its
survival have also caused concern elsewhere. As a treaty, the Kyoto Protocol
will not be binding on the United States until it is ratified by a two-thirds vote of
the Senate."' That development is highly unlikely in light of the current circum-
stances. The Senate has by a unanimous vote ' expressed its will not to ratify the
152. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
153. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xxviii.
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
155. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10.
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Protocol until the developing nations are required to participate in the overall
effort to reduce greenhouse gases and until it can be shown that U.S. participa-
tion in the Protocol will not damage the U.S. economy.'" Congress has further
expressed reluctance to move ahead on climate change by enacting legislation
calling for further study of the phenomenon of global warming and the ostensi-
ble means of controlling it.'5
These positions firmly taken by both houses of Congress indicate strong
resistance to unilateral actions on the part of the United States until fundamental
questions of viability, fairness, and necessity are answered with respect to the
entire climate change issue. To that end the EIA projections, outlined above,
demonstrate how implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, even in the less strin-
gent scenarios, will have a profoundly negative impact on an industry that has
been a fundamentally significant factor in the growth and prosperity of the
American West, indeed of the entire nation.
Returning to Prometheus, chained to that desolate crag in Scythia, we are
told that the Titan eventually was unbound by Hercules, apparently because
Prometheus possessed information crucial to the stability of Zeus's throne."' In a
similar sense, coal's future rests upon its ability to provide the American public
and its leaders with the information necessary to make rational choices with
respect to the Kyoto Protocol and its ominous implications-not the least of
which is whether the Protocol constitutes a viable and necessary response to a
legitimate crisis or a blueprint for the international redistribution of wealth and
opportunity on an epic scale.
Coal's challenge is a significant one, but inspiration can be taken from
George Noel Gordon, Lord Byron's own salute to Prometheus:
And, baffled as thou wert from high,
Still, in thy patient energy
In the endurance and repulse
Of thine impenetrable spirit,
Which earth and heaven could not convulse,
A mighty lesson we inherit.' 9
156. The Senate's position was expressed through a resolution sponsored by Senators Robert
Byrd (D-WV) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE). See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10.
157. See, e.g., National Climate Program Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (1994); Global Change
Research Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921-61 (1994); and pursuant to Title XXIV of the Food and
Agriculture Act of 1990, the establishment of the Global Climate Change Program within the
Department of Agriculture, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6701-10 (1994) (asserting that Congress is unwilling to
legislate the phenomenon of global warming without further study).
158. See BULLFINCH, supra note 2, at 18.
159. Id. at 19.
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